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The objective of the article is to analyze the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(T-TIP) as a new model of international agreements, the reasons for resistance and the 
consequences for third countries that are dependent on trade with the United States and 
the European Union (EU). Special attention is given to the relationship between Brazil and 
the EU in the context of this new trend of trade partnerships. Using a theoretical approach 
based on neoliberal institutionalism (KEOHANE, 2005; KEOHANE, NYE, 1989, 2002), the 
article presents a historical overview of the transatlantic negotiations and a critical analysis 
of the innovative aspects it brings. Even considering the potential unfeasibility of the T-TIP, 
it must be understood as part of a new generation of trade and investments (BALDWIN, 2011, 
2008). Similar to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, the T-TIP aims to introduce a 
robust regulatory framework that would affect multilateralism. These “big treaties” include 
commitments that are not covered by the World Trade Organization and mandates that are 
not traditionally attributed to international institutions. Therefore, they bring to light new 
elements in international trends that are yet to be fully understood. 
Key-words: T-TIP, international relations, European Union, United States, Brazil.
Resumo
O objetivo do artigo é analisar o Tratado Transatlântico de Cooperação em Comércio e 
Investimento (T-TIP) como um novo modelo de acordos internacionais, revelando razões da 
resistência e consequências para os países terceiros que dependem do comércio com Estados 
Unidos e União Europeia (UE). O artigo foca a relação entre o Brasil e a UE no contexto 
1 Pesquisadora Visitante na Universidade Livre de Berlim (ULB) e Professora Adjunta no Departamento de Relações 
Internacionais da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ). 
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da nova tendência de parcerias comerciais. Utilizando uma abordagem teórica baseada 
no institucionalismo neoliberal (KEOHANE, 2005, KEOHANE, NYE, 1989, 2002), o artigo 
apresenta uma visão histórica das negociações transatlânticas e uma análise crítica dos 
aspectos inovadores que ela traz. Mesmo considerando a potencial inviabilidade do T-TIP, é 
relevante entender que se trata de um caso dentre outros que faz parte de uma nova geração 
de tratados de comércio e investimentos (BALDWIN, 2011, 2008). Semelhante ao Tratado 
de Parceria Transpacífico, ao Acordo de Livre Comércio da América do Norte e ao Acordo 
Econômico e Comercial Global, o T-TIP visa introduzir um marco regulatório robusto que 
pode impactar o multilateralismo. Esses “grandes tratados” incluem novos compromissos não 
incluídos na Organização Mundial do Comércio e competências que tradicionalmente não 
são atribuídas às instituições internacionais, logo trazem novidades pouco compreendidas 
sobre novas tendências de institucionalização internacional. 
Palavras-chave: T-TIP, relações internacionais, União Europeia, Estados Unidos, Brasil.
Introduction
Since the adoption of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) by Europe and the 
United States (US) in 1995, several initiatives on transatlantic cooperation between 
corporations and governments have been undertaken. Transatlantic Regulatory 
Cooperation (TRC) initiatives have made progress in reducing costs for businesses 
and consumers in a few sectors of the economy in both regions. When European 
and American leaders instructed the Transatlantic Economic Council to establish 
a new joint High-Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) in 2011, 
their goal was to identify and assess opportunities for strengthening transatlantic 
trade and investment relations, especially in areas with the highest potential in 
terms of job creation and growth. The main goal was to respond to the specific 
characteristics of transatlantic economic relations “by identifying policies and 
measures” to increase EU-US trade and investment flows to support “mutually 
beneficial job creation”, economic growth, and international competitiveness 
(HLWG Final Report, 2013). The main concern of the leaders heading the joint 
efforts was to minimize the impacts of the US crisis and the sovereign debt crisis 
in the Eurozone on inter-regional trade and the global economy.
The EU-US HLWG was founded to boost transatlantic trade and investment 
between the EU and the US, which were looking for a more “flexible” and “open- 
-minded attitude” towards negotiations and the development of trade solutions. 
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The HLWG’s establishment, however, coincides with the emergence of new 
thinking in the wake of the failure of multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO 
Doha Round framework. The report of the Transatlantic Taskforce on Trade 
(TATF) emphasized the need for a new understanding of several aspects of the 
transatlantic relationship (COOPER, 2014). When we examine the Transatlantic 
Trade & Investment Partnership Advisory Group Meeting Report (2014), it is not 
difficult to identify efforts to build closer relations between the two cultural, 
political, and economic world powers (Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership 
Advisory Group Meeting Report. 2014). Since the 1990s, both US and European 
multinational companies have held divergent views on how to regulate markets 
for both goods and services, as these regulations are the principal barriers to 
transatlantic commerce. The main reason these companies seek to achieve greater 
harmonization in standards and regulatory procedures is to reduce costs imposed by 
having to comply with two different sets of regulations and standards. Regulatory 
cooperation is an umbrella concept that incorporates a broad range of activities. 
The acceptance of common principles and standards is seen as a key way to boost 
trade and investment between Europe and the US. This is exactly what was done 
within the EU to consolidate its common market (STUDY ON “EU-US HIGH LEVEL 
WORKING GROUP FINAL REPORT”. 2012). 
Establishing rules at the regional level and monitoring compliance with 
them can foster a more favorable business climate by reducing uncertainties 
(KEOHANE, 2005). Institutional arrangements and commitments also help to reduce 
uncertainties and to save time. Furthermore, participation in regional institutions 
provides a more precise picture of what is important to partner countries, what 
the parties involved can expect from each other and how they can develop greater 
mutual trust (AXELROD, 1983). On one hand, compliance can be costly, as can 
the formulation of rules and new institutions beyond a certain point. On the other 
hand, however, in the case of heterogeneous populations and situations where 
preferences for policies and institutions differ from one group to the next, it is 
worth weighing the costs and benefits of certain integration policies (ALESINA, 
LA FERRARA, 2005). 
Under Obama’s administration the economic policy has addressed the 
establishment of high-standard rules for trade as a vital issue within the global 
economy. As one of the most ambitious efforts geared towards achieving convergence 
and aligning policies, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) 
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appeared as the biggest inter-regional initiative of its kind. Some even go so far 
as to call it the “agreement of the 21st century” (BALDWIN, 2011, 2008). If we 
consider governance as formal and informal processes and institutions that guide 
and restrict collective action (KEOHANE, NYE JR, 2002), it is important for us to 
analyze the new trend in trade and investment agreements and how they affect 
global governance. Treaties such as the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (T-TIP) are pioneering agreements due to the institutional innovations 
they bring and the commitments made by member states. 
According to Baldwin (2011), there is a new generation of treaties that 
introduce strong regulations, expand negotiations to new sectors and will have 
strong impacts on third countries. The scope of these “big treaties” go beyond 
commercial relations between countries and can affect civil society and domestic 
policies. While there are many innovative commitments in the new generation of 
trade and investment treaties that deserve to be broadly explored, the scope of 
this article will be limited to the history of the T-TIP and the most important and 
controversial issues to be agreed upon by the member states. A critical overview 
of the potential impacts of the T-TIP on the institutional level can help understand 
the consequences of other treaties of a similar magnitude, such as the TPP, CETA, 
and NAFTA. It is worth highlighting that one of the most controversial issues is 
the inclusion of a mechanism to settle conflicts that may emerge over the rights 
and duties agreed upon in the treaty: “investor-state dispute settlement” (ISDS).2 
ISDS systems generally have full jurisdiction over conflicts and do not allow for 
any interference from or reviews by the national courts of member states. The ISDS 
would help investors overcome difficulties they face when their country of origin 
does not find it politically expedient to bring their case before the International 
Court of Justice. However, it means that the investors would have full guaranties 
for their investments, whereas civil society has none regarding the commitments 
of the investors. Furthermore, the US and the EU are so important economically 
to third countries that direct cooperation between the two regions will necessary 
impact the economies of other states. 
2 This is a type of international arbitration and an instrument of international public law used in other bilateral 
and multilateral investment treaties (NAFTA, for example) in which disputes and debts are settled without any 
interference from national legal institutions. 
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Ruggie (1992) defined multilateralism as a system of general principles and 
rules in which there is no discrimination between states. Based on this definition, 
in a multilateral world, global institutional frameworks are expected to treat all 
states equally. One would not expect discriminatory mechanisms that establish 
special benefits for a small group of countries to be adopted. The analysis of the 
new wave of “big treaties” provides a critical view of the risks that the alignment 
of powerful states’ trade and investment interests in a comprehensive agreement 
pose for multilateralism.
The objective of the article is to analyze the T-TIP as a new model of 
international partnership, while explaining criticisms and reasons for support 
and rejection of innovative rules and commitments included in the agreement. 
Even though Donald Trump’s victory in the US may mean the death of the T-TIP, 
the article aims to present the origins of the transatlantic negotiation in the 
context of a critical interpretation of the innovative rules emerging in the new 
trend of multilateral and bilateral trade and investment treaties. For this study, 
a theoretical approach based on neoliberal institutionalism (KEOHANE, 2005; 
KEOHANE, NYE, 1989, 2002) was adopted. As the potential impacts of these 
treaties on third countries and multilateralism in general are quite significant, we 
will examine in more detail the relationship between the EU and Brazil and other 
BRICS countries. The article begins by presenting a historical overview of the 
interests and goals of the parties of the treaty in which the context and challenges 
of the US-EU relationship during negotiations are highlighted. Here, we introduce 
a few issues and sticking points of the T-TIP in order to better understand the 
innovative aspects of the new generation of trade treaties. In the second part of 
the article, we will discuss the uncertain future of the T-TIP and its implications 
for Brazil-EU relations. 
The US and EU partnership and the challenges on the road
As has already been mentioned, the U.S.-EU relationship is the largest in the world. It 
makes up nearly half of global GDP. We trade about $1trillion in goods and services 
each year. We invest nearly $ 4 trillion in each other’s economies. And all that 
supports around 13 million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. And this potentially 
ground breaking partnership would deepen those ties. It would increase exports; 
decrease barriers to trade and investment, as part of broader growth strategies in 
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both our economies. It would support hundreds of thousands of jobs on both sides 
of the ocean. (…) I can tell you that it has been warmly received in the U.S. as well, 
both in our Congress and in our business community. (…) America and Europe have 
done extraordinary things together before and I believe we can forge on economic 
alliance as strong as our diplomatic and security alliances – which, of course, have 
been the most powerful in history. (…) This Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
partnership is going to be a priority of mine and my administration. (…) it has to 
be part of a comprehensive strategy that we pursue on both sides of the Atlantic. 
(THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE, 2013)3
The US and the EU are the two big centers of power of the West, although 
the economic crisis is still around. Together, the US and the EU already retain the 
largest bilateral trade and investment relationship in the world, roughly 31% of 
the world trade and over 49% of the world GDP, representing a trade of about 
$1trillion in goods and services each year, an investment of nearly $ 4 trillion 
in each other’s economies, and all that supports around 13 million jobs on both 
sides of the Atlantic. In his statement of 2013, President Obama made clear the 
US position for strengthening the transatlantic partnership: First, Obama himself 
appeared engaged in this project. Second, he tried to send the message that the 
Presidency, the Congress and the business community are all interested in the 
T-TIP; in other words, it seemed that there was no domestic conflict about the 
whole intention to overcome potential sensitivities to achieve the T-TIP at that 
time. Third, the trade and investment alliance seemed as the continuity of the 
military and defense alliance that resulted in the NATO. Also, President Obama 
attested in his talk that diplomatic and security strategies were clearly proved as 
close and related by the historical cooperation between the two regions. 
Indications of the US government’s intentions appeared once again in one of 
Obama’s last international moves to get the T-TIP approved. In his visit to Berlin 
in November 2016, Obama and German Chancellor Angela Merkel discussed 
transatlantic cooperation and Russia in the immediate aftermath of Donald 
Trump’s election victory one month earlier. According to Obama and Merkel, 
“the future is already happening and there will not be a return to a world before 
globalization” and “Germans and Americans have to seize the opportunity to shape 
3 This is part of the President Obama’s statement on the Transatlantic Treaty for Trade and Investment partnership 
in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland in June 17th, 2013. The announcement was about the first round of the Treaty 
negotiations to have place in Washington on July 8th 2013.
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globalization according to their values and ideas” (MERKEL, OBAMA, 2016). The 
leaders launched a joint appeal in defense of the T-TIP in the Germany weekly 
WirtschaftWoche: 
Negotiations started three years ago and, considering the complexity of these 
issues, have made solid progress. An agreement that knits our economies 
closer together, based on rules that reflect our shared values, would help us 
grow and remain globally competitive for decades to come. Today, many U.S. 
and European companies and employees already benefit from transatlantic 
trade and investments. Global markets and production chains are increasingly 
intertwined. We realize that decisions in one country have tangible effects in 
others. To meet all these challenges, we need rules that are currently being 
negotiated in the framework of T-TIP. (MERKEL, OBAMA, 2016) 
This clearly illustrates how much energy President Obama put into this 
transatlantic cooperation initiative. He seemed convinced right until his final days 
in office that this project was of utmost importance to the US, especially considering 
the international crisis and China’s growing power in a global scenario marked by 
uncertainty. China’s position was confirmed by its investments in infrastructure 
in Russia: a few projects are still under negotiation, such as the Russia-China gas 
pipeline, a deep-water port in Crimea, and a railway system in Russia’s Far East. 
By building closer relations with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, China is placing 
its bets on these relations serving it well in the future – a strategy supported by 
the current Chinese foreign ministry. 
While other economic and political powers were seeking new joint ventures 
in the East, Merkel and Obama were big supporters of the negotiations to build 
a transatlantic free trade and investment corridor. Since 2013, the US and the 
EU have held ten rounds of negotiations; the first was in Washington, D.C. 
between July 8 and 12, 2013. The complexity of the negotiations, their scope and 
scale, and the number of sectors and policies covered under the ambitious trade 
agreement affect the progress of ongoing talks. That said, the goal of building 
closer investments and trade relations was not merely a result of the crisis. In 
fact, for most trade agreements, it has taken much longer than a couple of years 
to conclude negotiations. The scale of the T-TIP in particular is too large to be 
achieved in a short period of time. To add to this, both partners have faced new 
security issues recently. The long duration of such a negotiating process could 
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be extended even further in light of changes in government, such as the election 
of Trump in the US. In the case of Angela Merkel, although she is favored to win 
Germany’s upcoming elections, she still has to go through the democratic process 
of electing the new Chancellor in 2017.
While EU institutions have already approved the T-TIP, some EU member 
states were still uncomfortable with the bilateral agreement. On the other side of 
the ocean, the new US president committed to not signing the treaty during his 
campaign. In this context, however, we still consider the strength of the bilateral 
relations between the US and the EU as well as its consequences to the global trade 
beyond the Trump administration. It is important to understand the complexity 
of implementing the T-TIP from different points of view, especially as similar 
institutional innovations exist in NAFTA and CETA, which are still in effect – or, 
at least, as of now they are. 
What’s new and why does it matter?
Between 1980 and 1990, regionalist initiatives took on new characteristics 
and scope. The pursuit of market liberalization with the goal of reducing costs 
by strengthening cooperation between the member states of the agreements 
generated what is known as “open regionalism”. In other words, contrary to 
“closed regionalism” of the past, a new phase of trade cooperation appeared in 
1980s. The “open regionalism” entailed expanding not only partnerships among, 
but also the sectors involved in cooperation (FAWCETT, HURRELL, 1995). The 
context of the emergence of the “open regionalism” can be explained by the 
rise of neoliberalism, which promoted the reduction of state interference and 
greater market liberalization, with greater freedom to sign different kinds of 
agreements with various objectives as well as the emergence of a greater number 
of international institutions. 
According to Fawcett and Hurrell (1995), in addition to the considerable 
variations in the level of institutionalization of the second wave of regionalism, 
its multidimensional nature makes it difficult to draw a clear line between the 
economy and politics. The proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) 
and international institutions in 1990s became crucial frame of emerging trust 
and predictability among the states and other international actors (KEOHANE, 
1989). The significant growth of regional agreements has been interpreted as a 
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“third wave of regionalism” in the context of the enhance of the interdependence 
among markets and states. 
Baldwin (2011) identifies a complex relation known as the “trade-investment-
-service nexus”, which arose from the new global value chains (GVCs). The 
complexity of the globalized world required new ways of cooperation and a 
search for greater institutionalization of standards and rights that affect gains in 
international trade. The scenario of the new GVC is the key for understanding the 
commitment of economic partners such as the EU and UE to broaden the scope of 
predictability in their trade relations. The globalization motivates the economic 
groups to operate internationally so they frame their activities through outsourcing 
and offshoring of their activities. International production, trade and investments 
are organized in different stages of the production. The whole process of production 
(from raw materials to finished products) and services are carried out wherever 
the necessary skills and materials are available at competitive costs and quality. 
The OECD has highlighted the broad range of policy implications of the GVCs. 
Neoliberal institutionalism has dedicated to framing explanations about the 
emergence of the liberal order and the sophistication of international institutions 
in the post war world. The strategic interests of the Companies under the new 
GVCs can also be understood as rational choices. The production process is located 
in different countries, then regional agreements about broader issues can help to 
reduce costs and time in trading. 
The implication of the new trade and investment treaties, however, is not only 
limited to the partners. In order to better understand the differences of the impact of 
existing commitments in the new trade and investments treaties as possible threat 
to multilateralism, Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir (2009) developed a classification 
of the new anatomy of regional rules. According to the authors, to understand the 
new elements introduced by the mega-treaties, one must differentiate between the 
commitments they contain and the norms and rules of the WTO – that is, those 
that establish standards already recognized by the multilateral system of norms, 
called “WTO in” (or intra), and new kinds of commitments that end up prevailing 
in these cases. In the new trade and investments treaties, in addition to the WTO 
in-intra norms, one finds commitments that extend the deadlines or the scope on 
areas and issues beyond what has already been established by WTO norms. The 
new norms are referred to by the authors as “WTO plus”. In these cases, deadlines 
can be extended or issues referring to obligations or rights already agreed upon 
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at the WTO are included. Yet, the most notorious innovation is the expansion of 
commitments that are not contemplated or regulated by the WTO – classified as 
“WTO extra” (or “WTO-X”). The WTO extra-X norms include both new rules and 
new areas of negotiation; investment rules on new issues in the agreements; the 
definition of new procedures; as well as new principles and rights that involve 
relations at the country level. Thus, when we consider the international relations 
as an arena of collective actions, it is possible to understand the aim to enhance 
commitments by institutionalizing rule related to trade interests of powerful 
international actors. However, as much as new trade commitments are out of the 
WTO, the third countries have no access to participate on the establishment of 
the new trade rules. In other words, once new regulations are decided between 
strong markets such as the US and EU, the third countries depending on trading 
with the US and EU will have to follow all new rules and standards – even if they 
did not make part of the agreement. 
The sticking points and actors
Although the content of the T-TIP and TPP negotiations has not been officially 
released to the public to protect national interests, the treaties’ texts have been 
leaked several times. As the extent of the treaties and their political and legal 
impacts on the domestic level are now known, the societies of many countries 
involved have expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of transparency and the 
extensive nature of the agreements. There are concerns about how much these 
new models of regional integration have the potential to profoundly alter the 
development of global trade and affect multilateralism, as detailed above. In 
addition, their impacts will be felt not only internationally, but also domestically. 
First, the new generation of trade and investment treaties could operate a 
real free trade zone, since the treaties aim to eliminate or substantially reduce 
barriers to the circulation of goods, services, and investments impacting societies 
and small business. Second, they cover new policy issues beyond trade, such 
as: intellectual property, labor laws, common environmental actions, etc. In this 
case, several typically domestic issues would escape from national institutions to 
be created. Finally, and maybe the most important, the new investment treaties 
create a legal framework for resolving disputes. It means that rather than creating 
certainty for foreign investors and states, the process of resolving investments 
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disputes through arbitration has created uncertainty about the meaning of those 
tights and public international law. In other words, public international law rights 
have been articulated for the first time in investment treaties (FRANCK, 2005). 
Even considering different points of view, it is still easy to understand why 
the T-TIP is less about trade than about increasing the power of corporations 
and making trade easier and cheaper (KHORAMA, 2015). The Treaty would lead 
to lower tariffs and therefore to lower income for states, though not to a very 
significant extent because tariffs are already quite low. Thus, removing remaining 
tariffs is expected to have very limited effects. “Therefore the focus of negotiating 
and modeling efforts is on non-tariff measures (NTM’S), or non-tariff barriers. 
These are procedures, laws and regulations other than tariffs or quotas that impede 
trade in goods and services between two countries.” (RAZA et al., 2014, p. 41). 
In this context, since 2013 negotiating groups have set out respective approaches 
and ambitions in as much as twenty various areas that the T-TIP is set to cover. 
The negotiators met with 350 stakeholders to listen to formal presentations and 
answer questions about cutting differences in technical regulations, standards 
and certification.
Currently, the volume of trade between the EU and the US is already the 
largest in the world. Even so, transoceanic trade often costs companies’ time and 
money: for example, when a car is approved in the EU, it has to undergo new 
safety tests in the US. The T-TIP was expected to reduce such costs and make 
products and services less expensive. It is too early to evaluate the impact of a 
transatlantic bilateral partnership on third countries and promises have been made 
to ensure fair access to the world market. Barker and Workman (2013) conducted 
a comprehensive survey of stakeholders to capture their views on the agreement. 
The survey ranked issues according to the importance attributed to them, the level 
of difficulty involved and the likeliness of them being approved, which helps us 
to understand more clearly the issues covered by agreements such as T-TIP.
60
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As we can see in figure 1 above, the findings are consistent with public 
statements by policymakers. The most difficult issues to negotiate are: market 
access for genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and agricultural products 
treated with hormones; convergence of regulations across multiple sectors; 
alignment of regulations on data protection and privacy; and harmonization of 
regulatory regimes and standards for manufactured goods. The most important 
issues are among the most difficult as well: GMOs and agriculture, and regulatory 
convergence. One surprising finding was that stakeholders do not see the 
convergence in pharmaceutical testing and approval requirements for new drugs 
and in environmental standards as something difficult to achieve or crucial 
(BARKER, WORKMAN, 2013, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 3-4). 
Once the difficulties are overcome, the EU companies were estimated to be 
able to sell an additional €187 billion worth of goods and services a year to the US. 
This looks good news for jobs. A survey commissioned by Germany’s Bertelsmann 
Foundation revealed however that the US incomes would rise 13.4% per capita 
thanks to the T-TIP, whereas those in Europe would only increase 5%. Even under 
this disproportionateness of benefits, on balance, Europe has the most to lose if 
the T-TIP does not go through, since Europe has fewer options than America. Also, 
there would not be an easy task for the EU to overcome its asymmetries. Europe 
is experiencing a serious problem of competitiveness of the southern countries 
such as Greece, and there are differences in the financial rules and exchange rate 
policies to be reviewed. Also, the institutional procedures to approve a treaty like 
the T-TIP have to follow all the steps of negotiation, which takes time.
In this scenario, in light of the new US president’s vow to stop the T-TIP 
negotiations, it is important to note two policy options that can effectively boost 
cooperation, according to the Trade Regulatory Cooperation Report (AHEARN, 
2009): (1) attract high-level political support, and (2) increase dramatically the 
involvement of legislators (the US Congress and the European Parliament). 
The initiatives to reinforce these two policies have demonstrated their capacity 
to keep transatlantic cooperation alive.
Thus, the first policy can be associated with the initiative to create the 
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), in April 2007. The Council was designed, 
in part, to generate the kind of high-level political support that previous initiatives 
may have lacked. In other words, the institutionalization of the cooperation can 
bring better conditions to design the terms of the development of the partnership, 
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making clear the steps needed to reach the agreement and the limits of the 
procedures that should be improved.
The second policy (2) is quite important considering the predominance of 
the executive as a driving force for cooperation. Thus, the involvement of the 
legislative branch could facilitate the harmonization of the regulatory issues. As 
well as domestic regulation of standards and measures are necessary in a growing 
market. Minimal regulation is necessary for the good heath of a free market. Thus, 
in an increasingly integrated transatlantic marketplace, Congress will be called 
upon to balance the often-competing demands of trade expansion and barrier 
reduction against domestic health and safety concerns (AHEARN, 2009).
Finally, supporters of the T-TIP and other new generation treaties such as 
NAFTA has agreed that these new models of partnership increase the volume 
of trade and investment with consequences for wages and jobs. Although, the 
benefits of the new generation treaties are not so evident with regard to real 
growth and employment. There are concerns in regulatory harmonization and the 
appropriateness of the ISDS regime in NAFTA (RODRICK, 2015) as well as studies 
that show benefits flowed to already-wealthy elites, not to workers, their families, 
and the general poorer population. In the case of NAFTA, “wages stagnated, 
social protections declined, and violations of worker’s organization and collective 
bargaining rights continued unabated” (COMPA, 2014). Also, despite the good ex 
ante predictions, NAFTA led to the loss of a million US jobs, and a significant fall 
in wages (SCOTT CATO, 2015). “In Mexico, the increase in productivity reduced 
the foreseen increase in manufacturing jobs, and at the same time destroyed a 
million jobs in the agricultural sector.” (BALLERA, 2015, p. 41). In general terms, 
the urgency of the T-TIP was justified by the need to act in geopolitical strategic 
way, the interpretation of the “West against the rest” presented as a “defensive” 
attitude. In reality however it was an “offensive” one, in other “to take advantage 
of economic, military and political domination so as to impose new regulations 
on a global scale regardless of multilateral institutions” (BALLERA, 2015, p. 39). 
As a consequence, companies and business groups from BRICS countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa) have started to feel concerned about future 
preferences of the US and the EU approximation since the Obama administration 
started to speed the T-TIP.
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If not the T-TIP there still is China and the others
Neither the United States nor Europe has a monopoly on how to deal with 
a rising China. Indeed, that may be precisely the point. Both Brussels and 
Washington have enormous interests in getting the equation right, yet for 
one reason or another—political mistrust, commercial competition, cultural 
differences, or others—both have more frequently been at odds over policy 
toward China than they should be. (GILL, MURPHY, 2008, p. iv). 
Gill and Murphy (2008) underlined how much Washington needs to vastly 
improve its understanding of China-Europe relations on the one hand and broaden 
transatlantic common ground regarding China’s growing influence in the world 
on the other. China and Europe are important to US, so their steadily relationship 
has not been sufficiently observed by those against the T-TIP in the US According 
to the authors, the China-Europe relationship has improved in recent decades, 
has been institutionalized and has extended to several sectoral dialogues covering 
areas such as: agriculture, civil aviation, competition policy, customs cooperation, 
education and culture, information society, intellectual property rights, maritime 
transport, space cooperation, etc. (GILL, MURPHY, 2008, p. 10-11) Today, as China’s 
influence in the world grows and as the European Union moves to recovery from 
the serious crisis of the euro, the US policy leaders strengthen its position forward 
constructing a transatlantic partnership under Obama administration. The T-TIP, 
then, has been seen as a reaction of the developed world to the accelerated growth 
of emerging countries, especially China.
Contrarily to what happened in the two past decades, the emerging markets 
became slow to make progress during the last years. According to the OECD’s4 
chief economist Pier Carlo Padoan, “the bottom line is that advanced economies 
are growing more and emerging economies are growing less.” However, China is, 
as always, the exception among the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa). 
While during the last Administrations of Presidents Lula and Dilma Rousseff the 
Brazilian foreign policy has been anchored in participating and playing a leadership 
role in multilateral forums, especially the BRICS, this emerging economy is involved 
in one of the most fragile regional integration processes. It has not been part of a 
bloc following a robust model of economic integration, nor is it participating in 
4 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) produces reports every 2 years on the 
economic and social development and democracy.
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any of the major transoceanic trade and investment treaties that are giving rise 
to a new dynamic of strategic cooperation and regionalism. The current scenario 
is that the US has demonstrated its strength again. There were positive results in 
unemployment, housing and business investments in US and Europe since 2012. 
However, we can conclude that the crisis has pushed the proximity of the two 
political and economic powers. The prospective of the T-TIP was to gains for the EU 
about 86 billion euros and for the US about 65 billion euro per year. The European 
business executives say that 80% of the benefits of an agreement would result 
from reducing the regulatory burden and bureaucracy, as well as from opening up 
services and public procurement markets. It is expected that every year an average 
European household would gain an extra €545 and the European economy would 
be boosted by around 0.5% of GDP, once the deal was fully implemented (TOSTES, 
2015). Finally, we have seen a clearer attitude in making this partnership a more 
popular and visible initiative during the Obama administration, but the issue was 
avoided during the US presidency campaign. The Transpacific received critics and 
visibility but the T-TIP was spared by the candidates.
BRICS and Brazil in the context of global powers
The BRICS countries aimed to form a group of emergent economies that seek 
reforms in the liberal international order created after World War II. The result 
is the reordering of international coalitions, the search for new possibilities of 
pooling of interests and optimization efforts on development and economic growth 
in the existing liberal order that is sustained by the economic strength that the 
BRICS were able to show in international flows of trade and capital during the 
past two decades ago.
Most of countries that integrate the BRICS have large territories, large 
populations, a varying number of neighbors with whom they need to accommodate 
interests. Another important feature is that the BRICS countries are natural 
regional leaders, which can be involved in regional integrations. The discussion 
about the role of the countries, however, is based on the potential for economic 
growth and development, but these same countries face the problem of poverty 
and inequality, anchored in historical processes of social divisions as a legacy of 
dictatorships and past poverty. Recent past of violence and social conflicts are 
reflected in the significant difference between indices of human development and 
inequality when compared with the numbers of developed countries. This means 
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that the BRICS countries have a dual ambition: beyond international insertion, 
they need to solve parallel problems involving domestic policy reforms, social 
policy adjustments, decreasing violence, poverty and inequality. The decision taken 
in the fourth BRICS Summit in New Delhi in 2012 and subsequently announced 
in the fifth BRICS Summit in Durban in 2013 to establish a development bank 
was achieved in the sixth Summit in Brazil in 2014, which was actually created 
to be a pivotal player among the BRICS countries. The New Development Bank 
(NDB) appeared as a promise to increase the weight of BRICS countries in global 
governance of development finance institutions.
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) data, 
China and Brazil have something in common; they made the best performance 
improvement of the Human Development Index (HDI) among the BRICS countries. 
According to the UNDP report of 2008, significant economic growth in China drew 
thousands of people out of poverty, but it remains a challenge to translate this 
growth equally in all aspects of social welfare and the entire Chinese population. 
The current China’s 0.699 on the HDI represents a remarkable increase of 72% 
from the 0.407 it registered on this scale in 1980, or an average year-on-year 
growth of 1.7 percent. (ENGLISH PEOPLE, 2013)
On trade, despite a very lucrative period for both Brazil and China in the 
past two decades, the relationship is becoming increasingly asymmetrical. China 
still intends to reinforce the south-south characteristics of its relationship with 
Brazil, and the value of better agreements and the strength of the trade between 
the two countries are shared among them.
Although China became Brazil’s main trading partner, Brazil does not 
figure among China’s top ten trading partners (MINISTERIO DAS RELAÇÕES 
EXTERIORES, 2011). Moreover, relations between the two countries do not 
constitute a South-South exchange (a balanced exchange between developing 
countries), as official Brazilian rhetoric may suggest, but an increasingly North-
South relationship—with Brazil as an exporter of commodities and an importer of 
manufactured goods from China. Approximately 79 percent of Brazilian exports 
to China in the first quarter of 2010 were basic goods (soy, iron ore, and oil). And 
Brazil’s imports from China were mostly electronic and capital goods. In 2000, 49 
percent of Brazilian exports to China were basic goods.” (PEREIRA, NEVES, 2011)
Brazil has tried to address the asymmetries of the bilateral exchange with 
China, however domestic political battles and institutional imperfections are among 
major source of Brazil’s lack of competitiveness. According to a Fitch ratings report 
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from 2012: “China’s Economic Rise Provides Mixed Benefits for Latin America”, 
the overall Latin America has benefited from the relationship with China by 
higher commodity prices, increased growth, increased investment, and improved 
governmental financials. However, as a result of Latin America’s commodity 
specialization and China’s transition into a higher value-added manufacturing 
exporter, according to the Fitch ratings in 2010, 92% of Latin American exports 
to China were commodities. As a consequence, the trade deficit with China has 
doubled to 0.8% of regional GDP during 2006 – 2010, from 0.4% during 2001 – 
2005. Therefore, several experts have argued that the long-term position for Latin 
American in this partnership would be poor and other sources for growth and 
trade such as services should be pursued.
Brazil in the context of the feasibility of the T-TIP
The BRICS countries are clearly grounded in regional political alliances and, at 
the same time, they actively seek to build stronger multilateral relations. However, 
unlike its most important trade partners, Brazil is lagging behind in the area of 
multilateral and bilateral trade agreements: it has no part in the “new generation 
treaties” on trade and investments. Furthermore, its agenda for preferential 
agreements is modest (only 22) and its collection of partners is smaller than 
what one would expect from a country that is seeking to establish itself as an 
emerging power on the global scene. At the same time, the US and the UE have 
chosen markedly different strategies for including provisions in their Preferential 
Trade Agreements (PTAs) that go beyond the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
agreements (HORN; MAVROIDIS; SAPIR, 2009).
The ambition to join the free trade zones with commitments dealing with 
issues going beyond the current WTO mandate (e.g. high level of standards 
regulation and property rights) is far from being the privilege of the wealthier 
nations though. On 2012, Colombia, Mexico, Chile and Peru signed the Pacific 
Alliance, which provides zero tariffs for 90% of goods traded between them. 
Chile and Peru, including also negotiating with the United States joining the 
Transpacific Trade Agreement, which includes nine countries on both sides of 
the ocean and promises to boost trade with Asia. Brazil, however, has tried hard 
to play a leadership role in the Mercosur since 1990s.5
5 Mercosur is composed nowadays by 5 members: Brazil, Argentine, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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The picture is that Brazilian foreign politics is constrained by the Mercosur 
and Argentine, which is the buyer of most semi-manufactured Brazilian production 
but is now under domestic crisis that affect imports from Brazil. As Argentina 
is the third largest trading partner of Brazil, after China and the United States, 
every point within Argentinean growth or retraction of its economy means many 
millions of dollars less in foreign trade. The slowdown of the economy in Argentina 
made Brazilian exports to the country fall about 20.7% in 2012, according to 
economic consultants of Buenos Aires. The sectors most affected were the auto 
parts, agricultural machinery and electronics, among others. The fall in imports 
from Brazil made Argentina’s trade deficit with Brazil decrease in 2012 to $ 1.5 
billion – which means a reduction of 73%. 
Mercosur has become less of an economic and trade regional project, and 
more of political forum in recent years. Since the impeachment on Paraguay in 
2012 and the entrance of Venezuela as a full member, Mercosur has been accused 
of becoming a political platform more than a framework for regional development. 
Anyway, the future of Mercosur can be directly associated to the development 
both at the multilateral level of the WTO and the interregional preferential level, 
among others, the T-TIP and TPP. Even considering that the impact of T-TIP on 
Latin American countries would vary, members of Mercosur, such as Brazil, can 
suffer with new standards and intellectual property rights. On the other hand, 
the success of the two big transoceanic Treaties would impact other multilateral 
mechanisms for regulating trade. The global multilateral trade system is to be 
impacted in a dimension we still cannot foresee.
Since Brazil was classified as a country of citizens with medium to high income 
levels, meaning that Brazil lost some of its current perks in trade relations with the 
European Union, the acceleration of Mercosur-EU negotiation become a matter of 
surviving. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) allowed the reduction of 
import tariffs on a number of items sold by developing nations the recent loss still 
needs to be calculated and new strategies need to be found urgently. In 2012 Brazil 
was the third biggest beneficiary, with sales of $ 2.3 billion, behind India (US $ 4.5 
billion) and Thailand ($ 3.7 billion). In all, the US gives the advantage to 127 
countries and territories under the GSP. Approximately 3,500 products used by the 
auto parts, construction, chemical, steel, capital goods and food again are taxed.
Besides, Brazilian exports of steel, machinery, fuel, beef and cotton go through 
the competition to sell to Europe, since the US sell the same products. For airplanes 
and cars, products manufactured here in Brazil have much competition in the 
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US, European products, as in the EU, US products. Brazil’s trade deficit raises 
urgency for new agreements. Indeed, there are two potential scenarios for Brazil: 
find new breathes with Mercosur or look for a way out the Mercosur. There is no 
way in between. At the same time that Chile and Peru are making agreements 
including free trade and bilateral agreements with the US, EU and China, Brazil 
shy it keeps waiting for Mercosur. 
In the 1990s, the European market was the destination of about 30% of 
the Brazilian exports. Since then, there were fifteen years of conversation first 
launched in 1999. Both sides have missed deadlines and compromises. Nowadays, 
the EU is still a major market for Brazilian commodities, especially agricultural 
goods. However, the exports dropped to about 20%. If the T-TIP gained breath, 
there is a risk that the US come to gain preference as an exporter of agricultural 
commodities for the European market, which directly affects Brazil. 
Conclusions
The interdependent context associated to the complex relation known as 
the “trade-investment-service nexus” (BALDWIN, 2011), which arose from the 
new GVCs, reinforces the need for cooperation and the search for greater policy 
coordination between countries (KEOHANE, NYE JR, 1989). Thus, there is no 
disconnect between the way business operates beyond borders today and the US 
and the EU’s methods of pursuing international trade. Comprehensive joint efforts 
to deregulate international trade is obviously a demand of big corporations and 
economic groups that operate around the world and do business with governments. 
The US and EU currently control about half of the supply of services in the world 
and account for one third of the global flow of goods. Although the two economic 
powers are still recovering from the crisis, defenders of the T-TIP argue that it 
can help boost cooperation between the regions, as it could result in companies 
saving millions of euros. If the two powers were to continue moving ahead with the 
transoceanic agreements, it would lead to a new global trade order with a balance 
of power that is completely different from the one described in predictions on the 
rise of the East. Although Obama and Merkel have said that the T-TIP could benefit 
their countries and regions, their affirmations seem to go against Ruggie’s (1992) 
view on multilateralism. According to Ruggie, multilateralism is a demanding 
organizational form that requires its participants to renounce temporary advantages 
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and the temptation to define their positions in terms of national interests. Also, 
multilateralism requires global actors to avoid ad hoc coalitions and adopting 
policies based on situational exigencies and narrow interests. “Yet [as] it is by 
no means a rare organization form in the world” (CAPORASO, 1992, p. 604), it 
is worth understanding the global consequences of comprehensive partnerships 
established between the leading economic powers of the international order.
It is crucial to highlight that transatlantic relations are already strong, even 
without the T-TIP. At the end of 2014, bilateral investments between Germany and 
the US totaled $339 billion and created high-paying jobs in both countries. Since 
2015, the US has become Germany’s most important trading partner with a trade 
volume of 173 billion euros, and conversely, Germany has become a cornerstone of 
the US’s economic relations with the EU. Indeed, the significance of transatlantic 
trade is even more impressive when we look at trade between the US and the EU 
as a whole: the trading volume in 2015 amounted to 620 billion euros, the largest 
between any two partners in the world. 
Resistance to the treaty exists on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet, one cannot 
deny that the arguments of the European opponents are more sound. Critics claim 
that the treaty will benefit big traders and exporters of products produced on the 
large scale in particular. Furthermore, some issues are more sensitive for European 
activist groups than for the ones based in the US – namely, the environment 
and health, which involve different elements of concern and protections for the 
productive and trade sectors on both sides of the Atlantic. For T-TIP opponents 
in Europe, the regulatory measures expected to be adopted in the areas of food 
security, health, animal welfare, and the environment will bring more changes 
for European procedures and principles than it will for those in the US. Even 
before the recent leaks 6 and the increase in protests and the rejection of the T-TIP 
emerged, shortly after negotiations were launched in July 2013, the Minister of 
State for Foreign Trade, the Promotion of Tourism and French Nationals Abroad, 
Matthias Fekl, warned the French Senate about the treaty’s incompatibility with 
the fundamental principles of French policy. Examples are France’s protection 
measures in the area of culture (especially the film industry) and agriculture, as 
well as its legal autonomy to resolve disputes in the future. 
In 2016, after the EU Council of Ministers approved the T-TIP, Donald Trump 
was elected as the 45th President of the United States. He committed to putting 
6 In 2015, texts on the content of and positions on the T-TIP were leaked. The documents were obtained by 
Greenpeace and exposed by The Guardian.
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an end to the US’s participation in the “big treaties” such as NAFTA, the TPP and 
the T-TIP. Trump may still surprise his electors, as he has made more promises 
than he can keep. In this context, this article hopes to have contributed to the 
analysis of possible or inevitable scenarios for a new form of governance being 
developed over the last ten years. Despite the current uncertainty about the future 
of trade treaties, it is fundamental to identify the pros and cons of such agreements, 
the impacts of their failure or success, and Brazil’s role in decisions in which the 
country has acted mainly as a spectator. 
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